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For Law Firm Liquidators, There’s a Lot of Gold in Them Thar Hills Aside from Jewels


For Law Firm Liquidators, There’s a Lot of Gold in Them Thar Hills Aside from Jewels.

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Saving Dewey & LeBoeuf


Saving Dewey & LeBoeuf.

Saving Dewey & LeBoeuf


Dewey

Dewey (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

May, 2012

The current state of the public record suggests that Dewey & LeBoeuf began its ill fated trip to disaster years ago. It appears that by last winter, the partners knew that a brick wall was hurtling at them at 200+ miles an hour. The question nobody has yet asked is whether the firm could have been steered to safety at that late date.  I would suggest that with capable leadership, enjoying the confidence of the firm’s partners, associates and other stakeholders and a collaborative approach by the full partnership it was possible to avoid the oncoming brick wall.

The starting point would necessarily be the firm’s October, 2011 partners’ meeting at which the partners were first told that about a third of the firm’s 300 partners had special deals under which their compensation was guaranteed at fixed lucrative amounts, not pegged to the firm’s profitability. The net effect was what Professor Steve Harper and others called a fatal “partnership within a partnership” and a Ponzi scheme. Much ink and much of the Internet ether has already been spent on why this dubious compensation scheme just doesn’t work and I won’t add to that discussion here. The point here is that reasonably intelligent lawyers, hearing a state of facts that commands a single conclusion, namely, that their law firm was on a catastrophic course, had the capacity to make critical flight or fight decisions. It appearing that no viable or credible stay and fight decisions were presented, a critical mass of vital partners chose to begin heading for the exit ramps.

The survival course that was actually foisted on the gathered leaders had no appeal. The “Plan” was to reduce headcounts, including at the partner level, by some 5% and foist a deferral of guaranteed compensation agreements. That cannibalism just doesn’t instill confidence since any reasonably intelligent lawyer would (and apparently many if not most did) conclude that this “plan” sounds dumb and other personal options should be explored. The flaws in this “plan” were essentially a lack of confidence in the incumbent leadership, an historic lack of transparency in management which did not appear to be changing in any way, kicking the can down the road with a hope for a change in luck was recognized as the foolhardy aspiration of dice rollers on a losing streak, a fear of being kicked under the bus in inevitable subsequent partner reductions as the “plan” inevitably spun into failure.

Instead, the only viable plan required (a) a complete, detailed mea culpa  from the firm leadership; (b) a demonstrable and credible guarantee of  full transparency by firm leadership with a new reliable form of governance with appropriate checks and balances in place; (c) a detailed explanation of the disastrous personal consequences to each partner if the firm should implode; (d) implementation of a public relations crisis management plan;  and (e) a signed pledge by each partner to stay the course.

There was no acceptance of responsibility by incumbent management.  Rather, months later the firm’s managing partner was unceremoniously tossed under the bus.  The previous clandestine management style was replaced by an apparently equally stealthy “office of the chairman.” Partners did not fully appreciate that massive escapes to the exit doors were more likely to be collective defenestrations.  Subsequent media disclosures were replete with, shall we say, dissembling, to be kind.  And public claims and denials by the partners of the existence of a pledge made for mirth.

Would this plan have worked? It was only tried once before when the New York office of a national law firm (the New York office was itself previously a proud stand alone law firm)  confronted with the fact that the law firm was destined for implosion because of claimed improprieties at other branch offices. The New York office adopted each element of the plan outlined above, with resounding success. But would this plan have worked for Dewey & LeBoeuf? We’ll never know. But we do know the “plan” it chose was an abject and tragic failure.

© Jerome Kowalski, May, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310

Avoiding Law Firm Implosions by Mandating Firms to Undergo Annual Stress Tests


Avoiding Law Firm Implosions by Mandating Firms to Undergo Annual Stress Tests.

Avoiding Law Firm Implosions by Mandating Firms to Undergo Annual Stress Tests


Stock footage taken at Beaumont Hospital. 14:1...

Stock footage taken at Beaumont Hospital. 14:18, 28 October 2006 (UTC) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

May, 2012

The horrific death spiral of Dewey & LeBoeuf, which started within the firm in October of 2011 and debuted its public spectacle in March, 2012, continues to evoke gasps and cries from all observers and participants. The latest horrors, not unexpected, are the loss of hundreds of jobs and the disappearance or dramatic reduction of thousands of pensions.  To be sure, more ugliness lies ahead: Draconian financial penalties to partners and prosecutorial inquiries of potential criminal liability for some key Dewey players.

The question I pose to you today, dear readers, is whether we are simply voyeurs or whether a sense of professional high mindedness should prevail so that urgent steps are taken to prevent the next seemingly inevitable law firm implosion? Did we come to the speedway pretending only to be interested in the competition but hoping for carnage or are we among those who seek to promote safety and prevent future crashes?

Dewey & LeBoeuf’s Current State of Play

The crescendo of public discourse of the Dewey disaster escalates daily. One of the most recent cogent pieces, sets forth a seemingly well informed and apparently factual exposition of the events leading up to the inevitable denouement.  Other well informed pieces analyzes the root causes of the Dewey & Leboeuf debacle.  A brief moment of levity was inserted into the mix as an avuncular former Dewey & LeBoeuf partner and department head stared straight faced into a  television news camera and calmly explained that the reasons for the firm’s implosion was that after Steven Davis, the now ousted chairman of Dewey, sat down with his partners in January and apparently revealed to them for the first time that the firm was functionally insolvent, headhunters had the gall to help partners find new positions, the media had the temerity to report on the facts and the district attorney had the audacity to conduct an investigation of serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing by senior managers at Dewey & LeBoeuf. These bon mots brought to mind the tale of the owners of a bus company who were called to task because they had employed an alcoholic bus driver who in his stupor caused a horrendous crash resulting in awful carnage. The owners calmly explained that they were not to blame.  The reason so many people were taken to the hospital was because of the fleet of ambulances that descended on the scene and the cause of so many reports of broken limbs was attributable to the zeal of the hospital’s ex ray technicians.

The fact is that since the 1988 implosion of Finley Kumble, then the world’s second largest law firm, there have been some 43 major law firm bankruptcies.  Each major law firm bankruptcy brings disgrace to the profession, disrupts lives, erodes confidence in the profession and creates a cascade of unemployment, poverty, death and disease (the rate of stress related diseases and mortality post law firm bankruptcies, reported only anecdotally, is staggering) and divorce (again, reported only anecdotally).

The blight on the profession is not simply the fact of these law firm failures, but the utter failure of the profession to address these failures and take any steps to prevent them. The appalling nature of this Ostrich like  stance is the generally accepted belief that a number of large law firm failures in the coming months seems inevitable.

The problem

The three inch thick annotated American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct that sits in every law firm in America is completely silent on the issue of law firm financial reporting, whether it be to the firm’s partners, its lenders, vendors or the media. The self reporting through The American Lawyer is largely recognized to be unreliable at best, or a large bad commercial joke at worst. Let’s simply look at the soft, puffing (and apparently demonstrably false) report that Mr. Davis gave The American Lawyer in March, 2012 as a prime example. Neither the firm nor Mr. Davis was called to task for gross overstatements of revenues; The American Lawyer, which derives significant revenues from theses annual reports and the hoopla leading up to them did not immediately exercise the requisite journalist imperative of rigorously subjecting Davis to the crucible of informed journalistic inquiry (although it did, to its great credit, after public disclosure of the Dewey deception, take the unprecedented step of unilaterally restating Dewey & LeBoeuf’s financial reports).

The Model  Code is also strangely silent on the issue of law firm governance. Based on what has this far been revealed and now seems indisputable, based on the public record to date,  the demise of Dewey & LeBoeuf is largely attributable to a complete and abject failure of proper governance. The tragic irony is that Dewey still boasts on its web site of its superlative corporate governance practice group. Read it now, while the web site is still up and running. If you missed it, here is a pertinent excerpt:

“Based on decades of experience in corporate law, governance, restructuring and litigation, Dewey & LeBoeuf has assembled a next generation capability to achieve clients’ goals… Our multidisciplinary approach enables us to develop special tools that allow directors and management to avoid ‘not knowing.’”

We can apparently now conclude that Dewey did not capitalize on its “generations of experience” in establishing a system for itself of checks and balances, oversight and accountability required of this generation of commercial enterprises. The firm’s culture seems to have been built on partners proudly “not knowing.” The firm’s mascot may well have been an ostrich; the firm seems to be a paradigm of the cobbler’s children going barefoot.

Of the two score and some firms that failed over the past three decades, all have seen complete failures of appropriate governance, inaccurate financial reporting and excessive leverage and debt.  Some, like Dewey have fallen victim to excessive compensation paid to laterals.  More have flawed partner compensation systems.

The Solution

The need to address these issues could not be more urgent. To rely on the sloth of the ABA to urgently address these issues, then followed by fifty-one local bar rule making deliberative bodies, which collectively makes the ABA seem lightening-like, would require the complete suspension of disbelief. To suggest that large law firms could be brought into line fearing disciplinary action by state disciplinary bodies would require the confidence of a naïf.  Despite the three inch thick annotated tome that comprises the Model Rules, the overwhelming number of disciplinary actions brought by these bodies only relates to escrow account defalcations and disbarments of convicted felons. Witness the fact that the current public record shows an ongoing criminal investigation of Dewey managers, as well as seemingly clear evidence of deception by some of these lawyers, some rather facially convincing prima facie evidence of securities fraud by the firm as an issuer of securities, violations of fiduciary obligations to partners, violations of statutory duties to employees and violations of rights owed to the pension beneficiaries of the firm. Certainly, there may well be complete defenses to each of these matters and I invite my many Dewey readers (or their counsel) to provide them below. But the real point is that while investigations by disciplinary committees are secret, we each can sleep soundly tonight assuming that no such investigation has commenced.

Rather.  the solution to this clear and present danger of future large law firm failures must come from BigLaw itself and its stakeholders, including law firm lenders, institutional clients and the academy.

What is required is for law firms to retain independent professionals who would annually conduct a stress test, having full and unfettered access to all of the firm’s data and information,  and then report to the firm and its partners (equity and non-equity) that (a) the firm has adequate procedures in place to provide adequate oversight of its management group; (b) an appropriate system of accountable governance is in place; (c) the firm’s financial reporting (audited or not) fairly states the firm’s financial condition as of the reporting dates; (d) the firm’s general counsel is timely provided with all information necessary to discharge his or her duties and that he or she has full and open access to all relevant information as well as the ability to report any concerns to a full governing body; (e) the firm has an appropriate risk assessment and management officer, adequately performing the require objectives of that office; (f) the firm has an appropriate mechanism in place to avoid conflicts of interest and to otherwise insure full compliance with all applicable ethical rules, laws and regulations, (g) the firm maintains adequate insurance coverage; and, finally, (h) no set of facts was discovered that raises any apprehension that the firm is at risk in continuing as a going enterprise. Any failures or suggested improvements in any of these areas should also be described in detail. Similarly, any deficiencies detected in previous reports and the adequacy of any steps taken to ameliorate those deficiencies should be further described. Should management of the law firm elect to discharge the independent professional because of any disagreements in interpretation, the professional should be contractually bound to disclose those facts to the partnership.

There may well be other items that should be included in these reports and suggestions will doubtless appear in the comments section below. If you have a thought, feel free to pony up.

I would further propose that the independent professionals conducting these tests prepare at least two forms of reports: The first being the detailed report described above and the second a summary form which might be made available to clients and prospective clients, lateral candidates and law schools as part of a NALP disclosure. Every one of these stakeholders has a simple right and need to know that the firm will be there next year.

As I suggested, it is extremely unlikely that any regulatory body will timely and efficiently create a mandate for these reports. Rather, a forward looking well managed law firm will certainly see the universal benefit and advantage of having such reports issued to provide comfort and assurances to its stakeholders and to avoid being tarnished by the reputation of a failed law firm.  The reports would be potent marketing and recruiting tools. These reports would certainly be most beneficial to top down management style law firms and those that operate in a black box.

I could certainly also see institutional lenders and clients routinely requiring their borrowers and counsel, respectively, requiring these stress tests, particularly as they have been seriously burnt by previous law firm failures and certainly as to lenders, they may correctly feel that what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.  It will, I suspect, take only a very small number of lenders and important clients to make these reports a required norm; indeed, mandatory. Similarly, it will take only a handful of the AmLaw 200 to come forward and proudly offer these reports to make their annual production an industry requirement. The market will require nothing less.  The implosion of a law firm casts a pall on the entire profession and creates a blot on every large commercial law firm. Those blots can be avoided by having  large law firms don the Teflon that these stress tests should provide.

© Jerome Kowalski, May, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310

Dewey, Sex, Lies and Videotape


Cover of "Sex, Lies, and Videotape [Blu-r...

Cover of Sex, Lies, and Videotape [Blu-ray]

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

May, 2012

 

Do you really want to be a partner in a law firm?

As we all daily sit transfixed staring at the horrific train wreck of Dewey & LeBoeuf, a firm with glorious legacies, many have already begun to undertake the post mortem to try to determine what went so horribly wrong as to bring the demise of one of the twenty largest law firms in the nation, a swift final journey that is barely two months in duration, which is remarkable for a 1,000 lawyer firm with a century of history.

.  The most comprehensive piece that has appeared to date comes from the brilliant and articulate Bruce MacEwen, writing as Adam Smith, Esq., in which Bruce dissects what is now obvious to most informed observers.  Some claim that some of the partners were simply too greedy and that the firm’s leadership was too eager to accommodate that greed, providing those partners with guaranteed incomes, regardless of productivity or law firm profitability. The fault, according to some, is base criminality and greed at the hands of the firm’s leadership.  Still others point to the firm’s unsustainable leverage:  Well over $700,000,000 in bank, institutional,  legacy and similar liabilities (not taking into account current liabilities for rent, wages, and vendors), an amount that simply cannot be sustained under any circumstances on the backs of 300 partners, bringing in $900,000,000 in gross revenues.  There are those suggesting sexual peccadilloes by the firm’s senior leadership.   Still others point to ongoing deception by current firm leadership, which one day encouraged partners to seek alternative employment in rather plain language and the next day, in the tradition of Lewis Carol, said that the epistle didn’t mean what it said. In other instances of unfortunate lack of candor, the firm’s leadership said that help was on its way in the form of a major law firm merger partner which was being discussed with “a number” of firms, only to fail to mention that all of those preliminary inquiries were politely previously declined.   Or one day promoting a bankruptcy strategy, while eschewing bankruptcy as an option a day or so later, no matter that the initially promoted bankruptcy strategy had no likelihood of succeeding.

All of the facts will emerge as the long slog of litigation and bankruptcy proceedings take their inevitable course, Presumably, some depositions of key players will be videotaped for the benefit of interested parties, courts and perhaps the movie (documentary or fictionalized) that seems to be inevitable.

Instead of dawdling too long over all of the foregoing (too much ink and space on the Internet has already been taken), I turn to the repeated lament of Steve Harper of Northwestern University School of Law, retired Kirkland & Ellis partner, noted author and keen observer of the legal profession. Harper recently returned to a theme he has repeatedly previously eloquently addressed, namely, the devolution of the concept of law firm equity partner, particularly in the face of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s utter deconstruction.

The fact is that in Dewey World, a good number of the firm’s most highly compensated partners were not in fact equity partners, although they proudly bore and boasted of having that moniker.

The hornbook definition of a partnership is two or more people engaged in a business who agree to share the profits and losses of that business. The Dewey highly compensated partners did not share profits.  Rather, they were apparently bestowed with contracts which provided them with fixed premium incomes, regardless of their own production or the firm’s profitability.  I guess we all now know that this business model doesn’t work. Actually, we learned this lesson in 1987, with the demise of Finley, Kumble , then the world’s second largest law firm, but as Santayana said, those who have failed to learn the lessons of history are destined to repeat them.

The point is why did all of these very smart, accomplished and talented lawyers take on the visage of “equity partners,” when that was simply not the case? There doesn’t seem to be any rational explanation.  These soon to be former highly compensated Dewey equity partners are soon to have some of the torments of Dante’s financial inferno visited upon them, as, among other things, they will be subject to clawbacks, loss of capital, adverse tax consequences and clawforwards.

A noted bankruptcy lawyer, who himself suffered through these torments as his firm went bankrupt thirty years ago said that he would never be a partner in a law firm again. His observation was that partners can do things to you even spouses can’t do, without your express consent:  They can make you liable for substantial debt, they can encumber your assets and otherwise wreak very real financial and professional havoc. This lawyer continued to practice for many years quite successfully and with a substantial client following at several very large successful law firms. Yet, he always was simply “of counsel” or “counsel” to the firms. His income never suffered and he says he never missed out on an engagement because he didn’t possess the adornment of partner. Given his success and standing at the bar, he had a voice in all significant law firm decisions. He was never inclined to take less money than he was worth only to have what he described as a meaningless ego gratifying title on his business card.

So, let’s see what happens to those who took on the honorific of being an equity partner in a world where partners are free agents and where partners are employees at will:  These ex Dewey partners will probably face years of legal proceedings as well as serious adverse financial consequences. They will likely have to repay substantial sums. Had they been salaried employees dubbed as counsel or of counsel and subject to simple written employment agreements (which in many senses, they actually were), they would be creditors of the bankrupt estate, entitled to priority treatment with regard to payments to which they claim an entitlement. The estate would be sending them checks, not the reverse.

Surely, ego is likely to prevent accomplished lawyers from taking what is ostensibly a step down, but that bruise to the ego should be assuaged by simple financial and other real world vagaries.

The interesting irony is that some of these highly compensated partners may well take the position in ensuing litigation that in fact they were not partners at all but merely highly compensated salaried employees and should be treated accordingly in the bankruptcy process. I can’t predict how the courts will react, but I would note that for the last thirty years, the lower levels of the law firm partnership have frequently claimed that they, too, were not actually partners; they were nothing more than salaried employees working for wages only. They had no role in management, and at best, were “mushroom partners:” kept in the dark and fed muck. The argument, while repeatedly made, has never gained real favor, except that mushroom partners (a term of art in law firm liquidations) typically wind up writing smaller checks than those at the summit.

© Jerome Kowalski, May, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310

Dewey Shoot the Lifeboats as Our Partners Seek Safety From Our Law Firm in Stormy Seas?


Dewey Shoot the Lifeboats as Our Partners Seek Safety From Our Law Firm in Stormy Seas?.

Dewey Think We Are Watching the Deconstruction of a Venerable Law Firm?


Dewey Think We Are Watching the Deconstruction of a Venerable Law Firm?.

Dewey Think We Are Watching the Deconstruction of a Venerable Law Firm?


Dewey

Dewey (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

March, 2012

 

Have you ever witnessed a sudden and unexpected calamitous and life threatening accident unfolding before your eyes?  Your brain is hard wired to provoke one or more of several different reactions:  (1) avert your eyes; (2) take flight for your own safety; (3) stare intently while frozen in place; or (4) leap to the aid of the victims.

As what may be the deconstruction or, hopefully, the salvation of a major, venerable law firm with either some real public perceptions issues or some systemic issues, let’s see what is unfolding before us, whether we are staring intently or averting our gaze. However this saga ends for this global 1,100 lawyer, 20 office law firm, the unfolding tale continues to provide important lessons for the profession and particularly for law firm leadership.

A venerated AmLaw 50 firm is now under relentless attack by the media. The attack, describing “lean times” at a global law firm,  I would posit,  is in many respects at the invitation of the law firm itself as it boasted of astronomical revenues – which it days later acknowledged to its partners were overstated by some $155,000,000 dollars. While the firm was apparently aware that a number of significant partners would be leaving shortly, it did not disclose these imminent departures to the media during its chest thumping session with the media.  Nor did it address the fact that the firm was fairly well mired in substantial debt — $225,000,000 by some accounts. While it still strikes me as being plainly foolish to publicly tout how much money a law firm is making, particularly when it is fairly well understood that many firms game these financial reports, what is so striking here is what appears to be a pattern of dissembling.

The chairman of the firm, is an M&A lawyer, widely respected for decades. Had he been trained as a trial lawyer, or instructed by his outstanding litigating partners, he would have been schooled in the fact that when you make your case, you must take the initiative and address in your opening and in your direct case the inevitable weaknesses in your case, so that you (1) establish credibility with the jury; (2) do not appear to be hiding evidence that will inevitably surface and (3) make the strongest case for these shortcomings in your case.

As the firm took its first several rounds of pummeling from the media, it realized that it needed to have a crisis management public relations program in place, a program I have long advocated that any law firm should keep in reserve at all times. The firm hired a crisis PR firm, which counts among its clients Paris Hilton. Thus far, what may have worked for Hollywood is not making it here.

The law firm we speak of is, of course, of course, Dewey & LeBoeuf.

While it is still way too early to write a postmortem, it is timely to review how this noble firm finds itself in crisis. It is equally timely to consider the potential of failure and its consequences.

The firm is the product of the 2007 merger of Dewey Ballantine,  a hard hitting high end law firm with profound capacities in capital markets, M&A and big stakes litigation, and Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, a well established law firm best known for its insurance industry and utility work. The Dewey side had profound share of “bet your company” work, where fee sensitivity was not an issue;   The insurance and utility sectors have always been rate sensitive. The business plan, as I understood it, was for the combined firm to focus on the high end side of the equation and to continue to grow by attracting partners with humongous practices with clients ready to send cash by the truckload. It appears that in order to facilitate this plan (and perhaps to meet some resistance about LeBoeuf’s more staid, perhaps lower paying client base), the combined Dewey & LeBoeuf offered incoming big hitting laterals multiyear fixed compensation whopping salary packages. Press reports suggest that some big hitting legacy partners signed on to the program but also sought these long term guarantees for themselves. Like the first time parachutist noting that it’s only the first step that’s daunting, it may have been these first steps that may have been foreboding, but unlike the parachutist, there was no protective canopy to gently guide the jumper through majestic heights. Much more frightening was the fact that these jumpers were diving into an unseen storm of epic proportion – The Great Recession. The consequence of the economic crisis was a universal fall off in business.  But, the new laterals and the legacy heavy hitters had the benefit of their reserve chutes; namely, the guaranteed comp packages. Apparently, even despite reductions of compensation for second and third tier partners and other expense reducing strategies, there wasn’t enough cash left to pay the big hitter class. Instead, the firm reportedly issued and these folks accepted scrip, in the form of IOU’s or deferred compensation agreements. Some press reports suggest that the total scrip thus far issued totals $100,000,000.

In early March, of this year, the firm’s chairman met with an American Lawyer reporter and announced revenues of $935,00,000 (remember this number, it will come up again) and advised that its headcount was then 1,040 (down from 1,400 at the time of the merger), an equity partner tier of 190, non-equity partner tier of 190 the net being unchanged from the preceding year, inexplicably despite the fact that in 2011 the firm brought on 30 lateral equity partners and lost 7 (I know this doesn’t make sense, but I only repeat what has been previously reported), profits per equity partner up by 1% to $1,782,000 and profits per non-equity partner down by 23% to $499,000 (yes, you read that right). The spread from highest earning partner to lowest is reported to be 10:1.  The firm apparently made these milestones  fortuitously because of the collection in December of a large receivable that was actually due in January. What Dewey didn’t tell The American Lawyer was that some real jolting news was about to surface.

In the days before The American Lawyer interview, 18 of Dewey’s partners quit. Days after that interview a group of 12 partners left for Willkie Farr & Gallagher. Among that group was the head of the firm’s M&A practice, the co-chair of the New York insurance practice and the co-chair of the firm’s New York corporate finance practice.

A few days after this jolting news surfaced, the firm had a regular partners meeting at which senior management sought to assuage all those gathered that the firm was on firm financial footing and apparently asked the partners to demonstrate their confidence in senior management by staying put and allowing senior management to guide the firm through some mild turbulence. Two days later another 7 partners defected, including the head of the Houston office, the head of the Chicago office and the co-head of the firm’s New York regulatory practice.

In addition, at the March 21 partners’ meeting, management advised the firm’s partners that they should be have confidence in the fact that the firm posted respectable revenues for 2011 of $780,000,000 (now it’s time to recall the reported $935,000,000 in 2011 revenues that I asked you to keep in mind a couple of paragraphs ago). Yes, there is a reported $155,000,000 in missing revenue, as yet unexplained. This is not a mere rounding off error. I have previously addressed the issue of some law firms gaming their reported numbers, but the most compelling piece about Dewey’s lack of accounting reporting fidelity – and, indeed about the entire Dewey morass — can be found in the brilliant and incisive piece written by Bruce MacEwen, writing under the ­nom de plum (nom de guerre?) Adam Smith, Esq.

As Bruce noted, Dewey explained away the $155,000,000 discrepancy (a mere $816,000 per equity partner) as being attributable to “different metrics” used by The American Lawyer and the rest of the world. One wonders whether distribution checks will be issued by accounts maintained using “American Lawyer metrics” or real money.

The point is the lack of candor. The firm, which already presumably knew that at least twenty more lawyers would be leaving in days, neglected to make any public disclosure to The American Lawyer, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Daily Journal or any of the media dogging this story before these departures became faits accomplit. Most painful, by any measure, is the fact is that so much of the firm’s leadership have logged out, voting with their feet with regard to the confidence they had in the firm’s senior management. Like the generals in Libya and Syria, they declined to continue to attorn to their leader.

The lack of an early discussion coupled with the continued silence regarding the missing $155,000,000 is perhaps even more egregious. Even Dewey’s ninja spinmeister is silent.

As recruiters smell blood in the waters, they are now swooping in like piranhas. The phones at Dewey’s offices are ringing off the hooks. The media will not relent. Partners will necessarily seek alternatives, seeking, at the least, safety nets should implosion mark the end of this tale. With so many partners at the firm having lateraled in and so may having their compensation cut to pay for these laterals, institutional loyalty is likely a scarce commodity at Dewey.

Now with implosion being a real concern,  law firms considering taking on some of those outstanding lawyers from Dewey, must prudently temper their enthusiasm with the fact that with the real risk that they will need to be repay fees generated by these laterals will need to be repaid to a bankruptcy trustee under the unfinished business doctrine articulated in Jewel v Boxer as well as the fact that the resources of many of these new partners will be sucked up by the consequence of the possible bankruptcy of Dewey (yes, I finally said the unthinkable “B” word).

[Update:  On March 27, 2012, Dewey announced a management upheaval, under which four partners took over a newly created “Office of the Chairman,” with the prior chairman nominally serving as the fifth member of that office, although he is also being exiled to Europe.  This palace coup was orchestrated at a rump meeting of one-third of the firm’s partners on the preceding day, with apparently little regard to the fact that the putch was inconsistent with the firm’s partnership agreement and the fact that the chairman was just duly re-elected by the firm’s partnership for an additional five year term. In addition, the chairman’s adjutant, the firm’s executive director, was also ousted by the dissident group and apparently placed in isolation, as a member of the dissident group took over his duties. Will this move lead to cohesion or further acrimony?  Will the lawyers hire lawyers to sue the lawyers who are their nominal partners?  Only time will tell.]

We all hope and pray, for the sake of all of those directly affected and for the sake of the profession that Dewey survives this nosedive.  The alternative is almost unthinkable. But the specter looms large.

Now, I invite you to suggest management strategies that can prevent the train wreck. Let’s all say we pitched in or at least tried to do so. If you were leading this law firm, what steps would you now take?

© Jerome Kowalski, March, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310

How to Succeed in BigLaw While Really Trying: A Four Act Unfinished Play, Now Playing at a Law Firm Near You


Is that Herman above the tree?

Is that Herman above the tree? (Photo credit: mali mish)

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

March, 2012

 

Dramatis personae:

Herman Laforge; 64 year-old chairman of Biglaw, Global and Powers, an international law firm with roots in the Midwest.

Marvin Shades; managing partner of BG&P;

Sheila Shuster; CFO of BG&P;

Setting:

Tower floor of Manhattan skyscraper overlooking the canyons of Manhattan.  Act I takes place in late January 2009.

Act I

Laforge:

I am still breathless.  What a year 2008 has been! Those banks going out of business weren’t as harmful to our business as I feared.

Shuster:

I don’t know Herman. We had some deals and some litigation work from these banks for which we collected fees through the third quarter, but then new deal flow stopped and the lawsuits were then stayed by the bankruptcy filings. New matter openings in the firm slowed by about 40% in the fourth quarter and hourly billings were down about the same in Q4.  I don’t see those picking up during the first few weeks of this year. We could be in for a disaster this year. We just don’t have enough work to keep everybody busy.  If this continues, we may be in for a disaster this year.

Laforge:

Have we got the preliminary numbers for 2008 yet?

Shuster:

Yes, Herman, they are in your packet. Be careful about these – these are the real numbers – not what we release to the media.  As you can see, our gross was down 11% and our net was down by 14%.  The net might have been worse, but, fortunately, we laid off about 60 lawyers and about 100 support staff.

Laforge:

How does our profits per equity partner look?

Shuster:

We took a pretty big hit here. PPEP was down about 16%.  We may take a beating from the media on this one, but from what I hear, there are lots of firms that are in the same shape.

Laforge:

That doesn’t make me any happier.  Look, I built this firm by growing, merging and opening offices in the major US markets. I was only able to do that by boasting about our growing PPEP and showing potential acquisitions that our PPEP was up there with the top New York, California and Washington firms.  I had to get it out of everybody’s head that we were just another sleepy Midwestern law firm. That’s why I move to New York. If our PPEP takes a dip, I am afraid that we’re going to have trouble growing.  We’ve got to get our PPEP back up there.  Shirley – you got any bright ideas?

Shuster:

Well, Herman, PPEP is just a function of dividing up profits among our equity partners. We could increase PPEP by either raining profits, which are is going to pretty impossible in this economy or having fewer equity partners.

Laforge:

You may be on to something there, Shiela. Look, our partners are actually paid pretty much what I tell them they are going to be paid. Our budgeting is pretty good in stable years. Why don’t we take a bunch of our equity partners and take them out of the equity class – we’ll de-equitize them. We’ll just call them income partners. We’ll just explain to them that at the end of the year, they’ll make as much money as before and that we just have to make this adjustment temporarily to please the media. We’ll give them contracts so that their incomes will be protected.

Shuster:

But, Herman, we already have a problem with our non-equity partners. They weren’t as busy as they had been in the past. In fact, their hours billed were down about 20% last year.

Laforge:

Tough times require tough decisions. Let’s lay off about 10% of our income partners. That should seal the deal. And as long as we’re at it, let’s take another look at our associates and support staff and see if more cuts should be made there. If we’re going to take on some hard nasty news, let’s do it all at once. Get O’Brien in the media department to have a press release ready if word about this gets out to Above the Law. Say something about aligning our partnership and support structures to an ever changing and challenging economy.  And throw something about how we are very strong and confident. Oh – and say something about how we’re looking forward to a great year.

Shades:

Can we do all of this?  I mean, legally. These guys are partners, after all.

Laforge:

These are tough decisions, but we get paid big bucks to make these tough decisions. We made these folks partners and I guess we can unmake them as partners.  Everybody will understand that we are doing this for the good of the firm. Let’s also be strict about our mandatory retirement policy. No waivers. Period.

Act II

January 2010.

Laforge:

It’s been another doozie this year.

Shades:

At least cutting some of our equity partners last year kept our PPEP respectable.

Laforge:

But our gross still keeps slipping. We have to pump that up.

Shades:

Any ideas, Herman?

Laforge:

Let’s get back to our game plan for growth. We got to 1,200 lawyers by lateral hiring. Lots of it.  A lot of other law firms have done what we have done – de-equitize partners.  Partners at law firms are just free agents. Let’s now hire some real big producers and shell out some real money for these guys. Real money invested begets real returns if you hire carefully. If necessary, we’ll lean on some of our partners to defer some of their comp to cover these costs. After all, it’s for the good of the firm. Make sure O’Brien sends out a great release saying how we are continuing to grow.

Shades:

Sounds like a plan.

Act III

January 2011

Shades:

It looks like we are beginning to bounce back. We got some really good talent and bought some nice business. Even after paying for our ramp up expenses, we are showing some real improvement in gross, net and PPEP.

Shuster:

Yes, but the expense side keeps going up at a higher rate than the profit margin.

Laforge:

Sheila – you’re going to have to cut some support staff again.

Shuster:

I’m on it, Herman.

Laforge:

What are we going to grow the revenue side this year, Marvin?

Shades:

We are going to continue to buy talent and business. I’ve also been speaking to a bunch of other managing partners whose firms have pretty good numbers. A lot of these guys have pretty good networks of international offices. They say that these networks of international branches are great for servicing clients with global needs. They also say that having these networks gets them on the short lists for big ticket items where clients have the needs for international resources on matters where the stakes are high and they can charge big bucks. They also say that these international offices are pretty good feeders of business to the US offices.

Laforge:

You’re saying –

Shades (Interrupting):

Yes, let’s go global big time.

Laforge:

Sounds like a plan.

Act IV

January, 2012

Shades:

Hermann, on paper, we’re looking pretty good. Our gross is up 4%; Sheila got our net up by 11% but we are still getting killed with expenses rising quicker than revenues. On top of that, in order to get the cash in the bank, we have squeezed our clients to pay every bill possible before year end. We did a pretty good job on that with the help of Sheila’s staff. Sheila also did a great job on juggling our accounts payable, deferring payments until 2012 to keep our net as high as possible.

Shuster:

Thanks you, Marvin. But, we now have some new problems. Getting those clients to pay quickly ate in to our inventory. Our accounts receivable are at an almost unacceptable level.  The banks have noticed that and have raised some questions. On the expense side, we are cutting and pruning and we are way down on what we can cut. Our accounts payable numbers are much higher as a percentage of revenue than they ever have been. And while a 4% increase in revenue seems commendable, it is only slighter better than flat. We still need to increase the revenue side.

Laforge:

Look, guys – this isn’t a complicated business- we put in hours, charge by the hour and get paid by the hour. Just tell everybody to bill more hours. I’ve read that a couple of firms are doing that.

Shuster:

We have another problem, Herman. We lost a couple of our old time producers last year. They took a chunk of business with them and the press is starting to ask questions. The truth is that I tool this pretty hard – after all I’ve known these lawyers for thirty years and I found it hard to believe that they didn’t appreciate what we were doing for them in building the firm.

Laforge:

I don’t get it. What ever happened to loyalty?

Shuster:

It’s just not like the good old days, is it, Herman, is it?

But we have another problem brewing, you know when we went on that lateral hiring spree a couple of years ago, we asked some of our second and third tier partners to defer their comp to help pay for the new business. Well the total of deferred comp is getting a little out of hand and some of our partners and the banks are beginning to worry about that.  Some of the guys leaving are telling me that the whole deferred comp idea is one of the reasons they decided to bail out. And the press is starting to ask some hard questions.

Lafarge:

Look, Marvin, you get O’Brien to prepare another press release saying how we’re really doing well and that these partners leaving is part of our ongoing efforts to align ourselves with market realities. And you may as well let everybody know that we’re going to be laying off some more lawyers and support staff. You know, the alignment thing.  We’re not the only ones going through this.

Shades:

Herman – with all due respect, I think we need a more comprehensive approach on the media side.  Look, we saw Howrey go down last year.  The leadership there just didn’t appreciate how what they were telling the media helped sink them.

Lafarge (rising, very agitated):

Are you saying that we’re in danger of sinking? Is that what you’re saying?

Shades:

No Herman. Calm down. Every law firm is at its essence a fragile business. The point is that we need to recognize the realities. We must level with all of our partners. We need to make sure we are all working together as a team for a common purpose.

We also need to make sure that our partners understand that if we continue to get bad press and they continue to bail, we could, heaven forbid, be this year’s Howrey. We need to make sure that every partner understands that the personal consequences to the partners if we tank are extremely dire.

Let’s take our own statements seriously. Let’s really make sure that all of our partners are actually properly aligned and that all are compensated fairly.

Lafarge:

Sounds like a plan.

Curtains Draw to a Close

Author’s Curtain Call invitation to his audience:  Please help me with writing the fifth act. How do you think this production should end?

 

 

© Jerome Kowalski, March, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

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