Leverage is Back: The Return of the Pyramid Business Model for Law Firms, with a Twist

Leverage is Back: The Return of the Pyramid Business Model for Law Firms, with a Twist.

Leverage is Back: The Return of the Pyramid Business Model for Law Firms, with a Twist

English: Great Pyramid of Giza.

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Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

February, 2012

 

Yesterday marked the 35th anniversary of my admission to the bar. The day passed quietly, without note or fanfare. But it did cause me to reflect on how things have changed.

In 1976, when I graduated from law school, there were some basic covenants to which all subscribed: If you did well in college, you got in to law school; if you worked hard in law school, you got a job at a good law firm; if you worked very hard as an associate, had the tenacity, appropriate degree of intellectual rigor and good humor, managed not to offend for the term of your clerkship, you were promoted to the partnership and looked forward to lifetime tenure, a sinecure from which you could not be removed and would not dream of leaving until you entered your dotage. Many, if not most, large law firms had a lockstep system of compensation for associates and partners. The AmLaw 200 listings, the source of more tall tales than any gathering of fishermen at a tavern, would not surface for a decade. Lateral partner movement was as rare as hen’s teeth. If a law firm partner in those days suggested that the firm should de-equitize partners so that the firm’s numbers would look better, he would be directed to a psychiatrist for emergency treatment. Partnership had real meaning, it was not an at will employment status and partners would not for a moment think of themselves as free agents, available to the highest bidder. Partners were proud owners of the enterprise. There was genuine esprit de corps, mutual respect, pride, loyalty and genuine collaboration.

These ruminations were prompted by the piece recently written by my friend, Professor Steve Harper, entitled “The Lateral Bubble,” a must read for anyone toiling away at or near BigLaw. Frankly with all of the buzz in the blogosphere and elsewhere concerning Harper’s piece, it seems that all have read it already or pretended to have done so, at the very least.

Professor Harper, no fan of partner free agency, observes that partners are no longer proud owners of the enterprise. Rather, he observes that BigLaw’s “currently prevailing business model encourages partners to keep clients in individual silos away from fellow partners, lest they claim a share of billings that determine compensation. Paradoxically, such behavior also maximizes a partner’s lateral options and makes exit more likely. In other words, the institutional wounds are self-inflicted.”

Harper quotes admiringly another recent article by Ed Reeser and Pat McKenna entitled “Crazy Like a Fox” in which the authors articulately demonstrate in cogent fashion how meaningless the Profits Per Partner metric is  (disclosure: Ed Reeser is also a good friend of mine and has been an occasional contributor to these pages; Ed and Steve do not know each other, but I can assure you that they are kindred spirits in every possible respect).

Say Reeser and McKenna:

“Over the last few years there has been a dramatic change in the balance of compensation, to a large degree undisclosed, in which increasing numbers of partners fall below the firm’s reported average profits per equity partner (PPP)…Typically, two-thirds of the equity partners earn less, and some earn only perhaps half, of the average PPP.”

In 2010, I wrote about the emergence of a three tiered caste system for associates in BigLaw:  Firms now employ “partner track associates”, “non-partner track associates” and “staff lawyers”.  The partner track associates are those from the best schools, with the best grades who toil away the hardest and whose academic credentials are touted to clients and potential lateral partners. Non-partner tracks associates are those who fared a little less well, and who have a fairly short shelf life. The staff lawyers are those who are most akin to day laborers, who float from gig to gig, often paid subsistence wages and receive no benefits.

Well, then, what’s good for the sauce for the goose  is good for the gander. Partner ranks have now evolved into a new three tiered caste system as well:  Highly compensated equity partners, a second tier of less handsomely paid equity partners and a great swathe of contract partners. As Harper, Reeser and McKenna observe, the ratio of compensation from the most highly compensated equity partner to the lowest is staggering; in some firms it’s ten or twelve to one.  The ratio for most highly compensated equity partner to the lowest level of contract partner is often even greater.

While we may have thought that The Great Recession brought about the demise of the leverage model for law firms and that the new model for the Twenty-first Century Law Firm is an inverted pyramid, the good news, folks, is that leverage is back and the pyramid has similarly returned to its old footings.  Except that the pyramid is no longer one with a broad base of associates and partners decreasing in number at each higher level of the edifice. With the devolution of associate ranks to the caste system, the refusal of clients to pay for first and second year associates and clients’ not permitting law firms to mark up and sell at a profit the work of temporary staff lawyers, associates no longer make up the base of the pyramid. Rather, it’s the ranks of contract partners who lie at the base of the pyramid and support those at its summit. As those at the top need more support for their compensation requirements, some equity partners find themselves cast into supporting roles keeping the rich and famous comfortably enjoying the view from the top. If more financial support is needed, partners are simply de-equitized, move down a notch and then fill out the base of the pyramid. Partners deemed insufficiently productive are asked to leave. The notion that partners are owners of the enterprise is gone.

Ample anecdotal evidence from the field corroborates the return of the leverage model, albeit at the nominal partner level. We have heard from scores of managing partners that those at the partner at the partner ranks busier than ever, working longer hours and grinding out the work as never before. Equity partner compensation at the pinnacle is at eye popping numbers.

The only issue not yet adequately addressed is the future of the pyramid when those at the top see the lush neighboring pyramid across the expanse with a taller peak, more lavish accommodations emitting a siren call for all those who want even more. Collapse of the structure comes not from erosion at the supporting base, but rather from the loss of the pinnacle.

Keeping the structure erect and enduring simply requires a return to the days of yore when all partners truly felt like they were proud owners of the enterprise, and a return to feelings of genuine esprit de corps, mutual respect, pride, loyalty and genuine collaboration.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

Citibanks’ Fourth Quarter Report on Law Firm Profitability: Bleak, But, on the Bright Side, That’s As Good As It Gets

Citibanks’ Fourth Quarter Report on Law Firm Profitability: Bleak, But, on the Bright Side, That’s As Good As It Gets.

Citibank’s Fourth Quarter Report on Law Firm Profitability: Bleak, But, on the Bright Side, That’s As Good As It Gets

Citigroup Center
Citigroup Center (Photo credit: LifeSupercharger)

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

February, 2012  

                                                                   

Don’t have enough to fret about?

Citibanks’ report for law firms for the fourth quarter of 2011 is out for and there is little in it that brings cheer. It also gives some us some sense of prescience in that our 2012 forecasts seem to be being realized. Earlier observations on Citibank’s third quarter report and its mid year report, all read in sequence, paint a rather unhappy portrait.

Consistent with what we all have all been seeing in recent weeks as law firms begin announcing results for 2011, last year generally saw a barely perceptible rise in revenues (4.1%) and continued rising expenses. The continued escalation on the expense side is of some serious concern as law firm managers continue to devote substantial energy to irradiate an ever metastasizing wave of expenses, with the wave of rising expenses seemingly unstoppable.

Here is some of the other disturbing news:

  • Citibank noted that in the second half of 2011, demand for legal services, “particularly in transactional work, withered away and has yet to bloom again.” In our view, we do not see transactional work flowering soon because of the moribund capital markets, the decline in asset value and the business world’s disinclination to take risk in uncertain times.
  • The report notes that profits per equity partner at the law firms surveyed rose an average of 3.3% in 2011. However, by hewing to the PPEP artifice, the report does not report how much of this increased profit was derived by de-equitazation, “shortening of the collection cycle,” expense deferrals or other accounting legerdemain. While Citi did report that “equity partner head count grew only marginally, reinforcing the view … it has become a lot harder to become an equity partner and remain an equity partner.”
  • While hourly rates increased slightly, realizations declined. Of course, that’s like the law firm partner who, when asked what his hourly rates are replies “$1,000 an hour when I can get it, but that’s rare, otherwise it’s $450.”
  • Headcount grew marginally more than demand, resulting in a decline in productivity.
  • In order to get to the modest increase in PPEP, law firms slogged the living daylights out of their accounts receivable. Well, that’s good for the take home pay for partners in 2011, but it adds to the challenges of 2012, since both demand is weak and there is less A/R in inventory to turn into cash in the current year.

What does this all mean for the current year? Citi tells us “all said, not a bad year and we suspect likely to be the new definition of a good year for the legal industry at least for the foreseeable future.”  In other words, this is about as good as it gets. By that, could it be that like Jack Nicholson’s character, could we find happiness in this somewhat addled state?

Citi is also telling law firms that it’s time to trim the herd again in order to increase productivity and realizations. So, I am afraid that we will see another round of layoffs, lateral moves, de-equitizations, and mandatory retirements. If you are a partner in law firm, pay very close attention to how your firm is doing, since there is a strong likelihood that we will sadly see some law firm failures; you need to be prepared and not caught by surprise.   And if you are a vendor or service provider to law firms, look for cutbacks and a longer remittance cycle.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

Private Equity Investments in Law Firms Have Arrived in the UK and Have Largely Ignored BigLaw; What Will Happen as This Phenomenon Arrives in the United States?

Private Equity Investments in Law Firms Have arrived in the UK and Have Largely Ignored BigLaw; What Will Happen as This Phenomenon Arrives in the United States?.

Private Equity Investments in Law Firms Have Arrived in the UK and Have Largely Ignored BigLaw; What Will Happen as This Phenomenon Arrives in the United States?

Tesco in St Peters Street, St Albans. Historic...

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                                                                                      Jerome Kowalski

                                                                                      Kowalski & Associates

                                                                                      February, 2012

After so much anticipation, the law permitting nonlawyer equity investment in law firms (“Alternative Business Structures” or “Tesco” laws) took effect in England in November and for BigLaw, it is much more of a yawn than a yowl. I can’t say I am very much surprised. I previously predicted this result.

As some have noted, the proceeds of capital infusions by outside investors in large law firms will likely be applied to technology and most particularly knowledge management systems, all with a view of lowering costs to consumers of legal services. The result would be increased commoditization and reduced revenues per lawyer. Thus, the consequence of such investments may well be that unless one creates a Goldman Sachs-type leverage ratio (10,000 to 1?), an extremely unlikely result for any law firm; the investor will simply not get the anticipated return. Moreover, as clients become increasingly reluctant to pay for associates’ time, particularly first and second year associates and the profession continues to move to an inverted pyramid model, that kind of leverage just won’t happen.

The practice areas which yield the highest return still remain in the plaintiffs’ class action bar and in big stakes high end plaintiffs’ contingency cases. The recent acquisition by Australian based, publicly held Slater & Gordon of Liverpool personal injury firm Russell, Jones & Walker for £58 Million serves to prove that point. Similarly, just yesterday, private equity firm Duke Street announced an LBO for insurance litigation firms Cogent Law and Plexus Law.  Massive class actions and other high end cases chew up enormous amounts of capital. Law firms which have been active in this world have already amassed substantial capital and have the internal resources to fund these cases. Some still utilize traditional institutional lending from banks at favorable rates. Others utilize litigation funding companies which do tend to charge exorbitant interest rates; but, then again, these funding companies accept all of the risk in making non-recourse loans and at the end of the day, they do not remain partners of the law firm.

Others have noted that outside investors in a firms would exert some degree of control within a law firm and the danger they highlights is that such investors will impair the independence of the lawyers’ judgments in directing that efficiency, rather than the clients’ best interests will be a driver in handling a client engagement, all in violation of Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

An added impediment is the preservation of client secrets and confidences. Non lawyer investor participation in law firm management necessarily makes non-lawyers privy to such secrets and confidences, with no mechanism to police the maintenance of such confidentiality by these non-lawyers.

Ultimately, the killer ethical rule in the United States that dooms private equity investment is not the confidentiality provisions or the requirement that lawyers act with independence. Rather, it’s one never mentioned in the discourse on this subject: The prohibition that bars lawyers from entering into agreements that limit their ability to practice law. Thus, equity investors in law firms could never have any assurance that a law firm’s most valuable assets — its partners– would exercise their free agency rights and ride down the elevator one day, never to return.

As the ABA agonizes over whether US law firms should permit nonlawyer employees of a law firm to hold an equity investment in law firms, the real question concerns the underlying issue of adoption of Tesco laws in the United States. The New York State Bar Association announced just a few days ago that it would create a committee, under the capable leadership of immediate past NYSBA president Stephen Younger to study the issue. But, even as he seated this committee, current NYSBA President Vincent Doyle proclaimed that the Association “remains opposed to nonlawyer ownership of law firms.” Sounds like a fair unbiased hearing on the subject won’t be very likely here.

The reality is that bar associations and government regulators were and continue to be asleep at the switch as nonlawyer owned and unlicensed LPO’s moved and continue to move to openly practice law in the United States and nonlawyer owned and unlicensed Internet providers of legal services do the same, These phenomena were the result of market forces and a bit of ingenuity and brazenness by these entities and the sloth of the regulators. The fact is that we do have a model under which non lawyers can effectively invest in law firms (yes, even commercial law firms), earn a solid return and even exercise some degree of control in what we believe to be an ethically compliant fashion. Interested, call me and ask about it.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

It Shouldn’t Suck to be an Associate at a Law Firm, Part II

It Shouldn’t Suck to be an Associate at a Law Firm, Part II.

It Shouldn’t Suck to be an Associate at a Law Firm, Part II

Front page of the first issue of The Wall Stre...

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                                                                             Jerome Kowalski

                                                                             Kowalski & Associates

                                                                             January, 2012

                                                                            

Today’s Wall Street Journal  features a piece entitled “Law Firm Keep Squeezing Associates,” which will likely engender some great buzz on the blogosphere serving the law firm associate population and, in all likelihood, a yawn from law firm partners. This article comes on the heels of the second annual extravaganza, attendance for which is appropriately limited to but a few elites, entitled “The Annual Spring Bonuses Follies.” In all events, I would suggest that perhaps law firm partners and law firm leadership ought to take a closer at some of the issues raised in the Journal.

The Journal generally addressed the well worn issue of fewer openings at BigLaw and fewer job prospects for recently graduated law students. Anecdotal evidence suggests hiring is down about 30% (a fact we also have observed as generally true). The Journal also mentioned the longer and rockier road to partnership.

But the big takeaway in the piece, a fact well already known to many of us, is that since the crash four years ago, associate compensation has been stagnant, while the average associate has seen an increase in his or her workload by 2.3% since 2007, which the Journal calculates to be approximately 50 additional hours a year.  The new base “normal” appears to be approximately 1,650 hours a year, which the Journal Suggest amounts to about 37.5 hours a week; the Journal relies on the besieged NALP (hardly a bulwark for full and open disclosure where employment opportunities for lawyers are concerned) for arriving at this conclusion. Yale Law School last year did its own math and concluded that in order to bill 1,850 hours a year, an associate needed to spend at least 55 hours a week in the office, with three weeks of vacation and two weeks of vacation, sick days and holidays.  Yale concludes that in order for an associate to bill in the 2,000 a year range, he or she will need to work for about 12 hours a day and three weekend days a month. And that does not accurately include time spent at departmental meetings, firm functions, commuting, serving on administrative committees, recruiting, pro bono work, griping about being overworked or otherwise shooting the breeze with colleagues, friends or family. The reality, as we all know, is that an honest time reporter needs to work in the seventy hour a week range.

But let’s get back to that additional 50 hours a year squeezed out of associates since the onset of The Great Recession. Roughly translated, at an average of $300 an hour, associates have each contributed an extra $150,000 to their respective firm’s bottom line, without their firm’s incurring any incremental cost. A few firms, in an entirely short sighted fashion, in our opinion, have bestowed “Spring bonuses,” generally topped out at $37,000, while the bulk of BigLaw firms have simply enhanced partner profitability.

The fact is that Spring bonuses have a Marie Antoinette quality about them, a sort of noblesse oblige.  As Steve Harper noted, law firms should do better. They do not enhance associate morale nor do they halt associate attrition. The temporal cure to associate attrition has been an abysmal job market. But, for those who are planning on checking out, all that many law firms have done is have associates defer packing their bags until the bonus check clears. Spring bonuses not quite as satisfying as yesterday’s passing summer breezes, the recent autumnal foliage or Thanksgiving turkey. The breezes, foliage and turkey will likely return at their respective times and seasons; Spring bonuses, who knows?  With law firm revenues rising last year at a sluggish 3% and expenses at 9%, law firms, under pressure to keep PPP at the highest levels and the bulk of AmLaw 100 firms having gotten along just fine without them, this chimera will likely evaporate.

Well then, what’s the point?  There are two: We all know that associates are law firms’ most important profit centers. We also need to be reminded that keeping the young men and women toiling away productively at 60 hours a week, during their decade-long march to the brass ring, optimally requires them to have a high degree of job satisfaction, which has nothing to do with compensation or bonuses.  For nearly a century, every study performed by every industrial psychologist and labor economist has consistently reported that when people identify the reasons they leave their jobs, they rate compensation at the very bottom of their lists.  Overwork ranks at about the same. We know how to keep associates satisfied and productive, but we largely continue to ignore long learned basic human resources principles.

So, let’s take a look at the extra $150,000 per annum each associate is contributing to law firm revenue streams.  Why not engage your associates in a dialogue as to what should be done to improve their lives. Some might suggest an increase in base compensation to help them amortize student loans (and if you hear that don’t wince and worry what the neighbors might think), some might suggest rolling the work squeeze and laying off some of those collective additional 50 hours a year on a couple of new associates. After all, if you have 100 associates, you have effectively replaced two associates by having those remaining in the galleon just row harder. Exhausted oarsmen often collapse or jump ship. The golden chains of Spring bonuses won’t keep your associates tied to their oars. In fact, even The Great Recession and the burden of student debt do not necessarily keep them in the ship’s underbelly deprived of sunlight and overworked; one associate recently left his firm to open a bike shop, anther jumped ship to simply walk across the country.

The second point is quite simply, it still shouldn’t suck to be an associate at a law firm.

© Jerome Kowalski, January, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

Difficult Times Sometimes Create Desperate People Who Do Desperate Things: Loss Prevention in Handling Client Escrow Funds

Difficult Times Sometimes Create Desperate People Who Do Desperate Things: Loss Prevention in Handling Client Escrow Funds.

Difficult Times Sometimes Create Desperate People Who Do Desperate Things: Loss Prevention in Handling Client Escrow Funds

Atla Escrow

Image by Thomas Hawk via Flickr

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

January, 2012

My copy of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility runs to some 500 pages, with sundry commentaries.  The Code plumbs virtually aspect of a practicing law and details that which can be done by lawyers and that which may not. One relatively brief section deals with lawyers handling of client funds held in the law firm’s escrow account, sometimes called “Escrow Accounts,” “Special Accounts,” “Trust Accounts” or “IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts – but this one is a long and irrelevant boring story).   Cut to the quick, the Model Rules say just three things:  (1) Don’t co-mingle these funds with any other account; (2) deal with these funds exactly as instructed by the client and affected parties, as detailed in an appropriate escrow agreement and (3) if you even think about screwing around with these rules, you’re gonna fry.

In New York City, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee, the judicial authority having authority over lawyers’ compliance with applicable rules, investigates thousands of complaints filed against lawyers for all sorts of alleged violations of the applicable rules.  Yet, perhaps 80% of all suspensions and disbarments result from either defalcations or co-mingling of client funds. Here, justice is swift and certain. The Committee has long had a zero tolerance policy with regard to any impropriety concerning client funds, a view held by all governing bodies. Suspension or disbarment is the only result.

These facts are well known to all practitioners and may even strike some as a hackneyed topic. But recent reports of significant defalcations by a former counsel at a BigLaw firm of what may be as much as $20,000,000 and in another instance of the chair of a global law firm’s Asian gaming group having allegedly slipped out some $2,000,000 from client escrow funds to allegedly cover his own gambling losses suggest that this topic requires  careful review.  Indeed in year-end reviews by several of our law firm clients, prompted by the recent tawdry headlines, controls over client escrow funds were studied and found to be lacking. There have also been a recent spate of unsubstantiated rumors concerning of escrow account improprieties that are, simply put, more than troubling.

Some law firms dispense with the entire issue by simply eschewing, as a general rule, the maintenance of any escrow accounts. Where funds are required to be escrowed, these firms advise the retention of an independent trust company, bank, title company or where permitted, a duly licensed escrow agent.  However, often, local custom and usage requires law firms to maintain escrow accounts, which are fraught with peril, if not subject to stringent controls by the law firm. These controls should be described in writing and the firm’s policies regarding client funds should be in writing and part of its employee  handbook.  These rules should also be part of every new lawyer’s orientation session as he or she arrives at the law firm.

The required controls begin with the commencement of the client relationship. Every engagement letter must contain a disclosure regarding the law firm’s escrow policies. The letter should describe the firm’s policies concerning escrowed funds and, particularly, the requirement that all funds released from escrow require two partner signatures. Funds released by wire transfer require a separate email confirmation from a law firm partner to the escrowee.  The engagement letter should require the client to report any departure from these rules to the firm’s managing partner. The need for the double signature and reporting is best demonstrated by the fact that in one of the recently reported instances of trust fund defalcation, a counsel of a national law firm is reported to have taken a check drawn payable to his law firm, as escrow agent, walked across the street and simply opened an account in the firm’s name, making himself the sole signatory, without the bank requiring any certification from any partner at the law firm.

The law firm should not allow the deposit of any escrow funds without an accompanying escrow agreement. Thus, the firm should have a tightly drafted model form of escrow agreement, with appropriate exculpatory language, from which there should be no material departure, except upon written consent from department head, an office head or an executive committee member.  Each such agreement should also require the signature of such a member of management. When funds are deposited in to the escrow agreement, the requested deposit should only be permitted to be made to the accounting department of the escrow agreement, the underlying agreement, stipulation or other instrument giving rise to the creation of the escrow, as well as a memo (or standard form) from the responsible lawyer describing underlying transaction and the conditions precedent for the ultimate release of the escrow. This initiating memo should also include the client’s contact information. The memo form should be countersigned by a member of management. A member of the accounting department should examine the entire submission for regularity and completeness.  Any departure from the firm’s escrow policies must be reported in writing by the escrow clerk to the responsible lawyer, as well as to a member of management (optimally, if the firm has an in-house general counsel, the mater should be addressed to him or her), even if the departure seems to be only clerical or ministerial.

When funds are mature and are required to be released, the responsible lawyer should prepare a new memo (or standard form), describing the transaction should be prepared by the responsible lawyer and countersigned by two partners with management responsibilities, such as an office head, department chair or member of the executive committee. The submission should again include the underlying escrow agreement and governing instrument. Again, the escrow clerk should examine the entire submission for completeness and be obligated to report in writing any irregularities to each of the lawyers who have already put their fingerprints on the escrow arrangement as well as general counsel or a designated separate member of management. As I mentioned above, all checks drawn on the escrow account should require the signature of two partners, neither one of which is directly involved with the matter.  If a wire transfer is required, the clerk should send a confirmatory email to the client, using the email address originally provided at the time of the original submission.

Where law firms sometimes screw up is in connection with smaller branch offices, at which smaller support staffs and reduced lawyer headcounts often breeds shortcuts, for the sake of expediency. The fact is that far greater scrutiny is essential for smaller branch offices, which often takes on a degree of laxness and informality, primarily because of the greater sense of intimacy such smaller offices promote. In the age of the Internet, emails and paperless offices, there is no excuse for departing from the required controls. There simply must be zero tolerance for any departure from these controls. After all, bar associations and other governing bodies have none.

The law firm’s general counsel, chief financial officer and its chief risk manager should be responsible for regularly monitoring activities in the firm’s escrow accounts and its escrow clerical staff. As much as law firms are allergic to certified financial audits, the law firm’s outside accounting firm should be required to annually audit its escrow funds and provide written certification that all controls are in place and there is full compliance with the firm’s stated policies.

Finally, as too few lawyers realize, defalcations from escrow funds are not covered by a law firm’s malpractice policies. A separate fiduciary policy is required. Insurance carriers tend to be rather chintzy on these policies, often limiting coverage to $5,000,000. That may be far too low, if your firm’s escrow balances or individual escrow accounts exceed that amount.  You should explore increased coverage or excess coverage with your insurance adviser. And, finally, always be prepared for the public relations hailstorm that will assuredly ensue if you are indeed the victim of a nefarious lawyer with your firm.

© Jerome Kowalski, January, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

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