What is the Fair Market Value of a Full Service Commercial Law Firm?

What is the Fair Market Value of a Full Service Commercial Law Firm?.

What is the Fair Market Value of a Full Service Commercial Law Firm?

The Mumbai Stock Exchange stands tall, and is ...

Image via Wikipedia

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

February, 2012

 

 

A short piece in today’s the Wall Street Journal caught my eye: The Journal reported that a report was just issued that “estimates that top U.K. law firms are worth between $711 million to $4.1 billion, with Magic Circle firm Allen & Overy leading the pack.”    The report the Journal made reference to was brief and from Europa Partners which stated that it had just completed its second annual valuation of UK based law firms and found that “Law firms are valuable businesses; six of the top ten by value are large enough to be included in the FTSE100 if they were listed.”

I wonder.

When I went to school, I learned that the definition of value was “the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, each negotiating n good faith and neither under duress.”  Well then, is there a willing buyer out there for any of these firms?  We don’t see any. The Alternative Business Structure, sometimes called the Tesco law, does allow for non-lawyer ownership of law firms in the United Kingdom and Wales. But, as I predicted some time ago, there aren’t any non-lawyer buyers lining up or kicking the tires for large commercial law firms. With the top ten magic circle firms valued in the eye-popping range of $711,000,000 to $4,200,000,000, I suspect that more than a few equity partners at these well heeled law firms would be seriously thinking about cashing in their chips if there were a willing buyer out there. I know you would. I certainly would.

We have all learned the hard way that lawyers, trusted business advisers to the global markets, have concocted the silliest business model for their own business.  In any other endeavor, a business owner invests capital, sweat equity and builds a viable enterprise and looks forward to an exit strategy, where he or she could sell the business or perhaps leave it to his or her children. Lawyers can do neither. If they are lucky, they get to retire voluntarily when they are ready (not when they are forced to) and then simply get their own money, namely, their capital contributions, back over a period of years. Maybe a nice dinner with a couple of partners is thrown in as well. But no premium and no premium for having built a successful business. Anti-nepotism rules typically preclude a bequest of a partner’s ownership rights to his or her offspring.

More painfully, a large commercial law firm has less than zero value on liquidation or winding down.  In fact, such scenarios have been enormously costly for partners in such law firms.

Well, then, what is a commercial law firm worth? Nothing, really. I have no idea what Europa Partners’ valuation methodology was, but whatever methodology was deployed, it certainly couldn’t result in a fair market value with the standard textbook definition of value.

The Achilles’ heel in valuing a law firm is that its most valuable assets, its working partners, ride that old elevator down every night and in this age of partner free agency, there is only a hope and a prayer that these assets will return the next day to contribute to the production line. Our colleagues across the pond do have an advantage in maintaining some value for these assets in some respects in that the rules in the UK do allow for “garden leaves,” under which a withdrawing partner can be compelled to spend many months after he or she withdraws from a law sitting at home enjoying the garden or just sucking wind. But, in most of the United States, Rule 5.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct bars a lawyer from entering into any agreement which restricts him or her from practicing law. No restrictive covenants here.

But, I digress.

The point is as we go through the wrenching changes wrought by The Great Recession, clever lawyers, with a bit of self interest should be thinking about re-designing the entire business model of law firms and the delivery of legal services. While the American Bar Association dithers with little bits of the non-lawyer ownership of law firms issue for no good or productive reason, the market – and clever lawyers – will develop a new structure which create a new structure for the delivery of legal services, which will have real value, be saleable and scalable. Our LPO competitors have already figured out how to do so and may be soon eating our lunch. And their enterprises have real value.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

 

Leverage is Back: The Return of the Pyramid Business Model for Law Firms, with a Twist

Leverage is Back: The Return of the Pyramid Business Model for Law Firms, with a Twist.

Leverage is Back: The Return of the Pyramid Business Model for Law Firms, with a Twist

English: Great Pyramid of Giza.

Image via Wikipedia

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

February, 2012

 

Yesterday marked the 35th anniversary of my admission to the bar. The day passed quietly, without note or fanfare. But it did cause me to reflect on how things have changed.

In 1976, when I graduated from law school, there were some basic covenants to which all subscribed: If you did well in college, you got in to law school; if you worked hard in law school, you got a job at a good law firm; if you worked very hard as an associate, had the tenacity, appropriate degree of intellectual rigor and good humor, managed not to offend for the term of your clerkship, you were promoted to the partnership and looked forward to lifetime tenure, a sinecure from which you could not be removed and would not dream of leaving until you entered your dotage. Many, if not most, large law firms had a lockstep system of compensation for associates and partners. The AmLaw 200 listings, the source of more tall tales than any gathering of fishermen at a tavern, would not surface for a decade. Lateral partner movement was as rare as hen’s teeth. If a law firm partner in those days suggested that the firm should de-equitize partners so that the firm’s numbers would look better, he would be directed to a psychiatrist for emergency treatment. Partnership had real meaning, it was not an at will employment status and partners would not for a moment think of themselves as free agents, available to the highest bidder. Partners were proud owners of the enterprise. There was genuine esprit de corps, mutual respect, pride, loyalty and genuine collaboration.

These ruminations were prompted by the piece recently written by my friend, Professor Steve Harper, entitled “The Lateral Bubble,” a must read for anyone toiling away at or near BigLaw. Frankly with all of the buzz in the blogosphere and elsewhere concerning Harper’s piece, it seems that all have read it already or pretended to have done so, at the very least.

Professor Harper, no fan of partner free agency, observes that partners are no longer proud owners of the enterprise. Rather, he observes that BigLaw’s “currently prevailing business model encourages partners to keep clients in individual silos away from fellow partners, lest they claim a share of billings that determine compensation. Paradoxically, such behavior also maximizes a partner’s lateral options and makes exit more likely. In other words, the institutional wounds are self-inflicted.”

Harper quotes admiringly another recent article by Ed Reeser and Pat McKenna entitled “Crazy Like a Fox” in which the authors articulately demonstrate in cogent fashion how meaningless the Profits Per Partner metric is  (disclosure: Ed Reeser is also a good friend of mine and has been an occasional contributor to these pages; Ed and Steve do not know each other, but I can assure you that they are kindred spirits in every possible respect).

Say Reeser and McKenna:

“Over the last few years there has been a dramatic change in the balance of compensation, to a large degree undisclosed, in which increasing numbers of partners fall below the firm’s reported average profits per equity partner (PPP)…Typically, two-thirds of the equity partners earn less, and some earn only perhaps half, of the average PPP.”

In 2010, I wrote about the emergence of a three tiered caste system for associates in BigLaw:  Firms now employ “partner track associates”, “non-partner track associates” and “staff lawyers”.  The partner track associates are those from the best schools, with the best grades who toil away the hardest and whose academic credentials are touted to clients and potential lateral partners. Non-partner tracks associates are those who fared a little less well, and who have a fairly short shelf life. The staff lawyers are those who are most akin to day laborers, who float from gig to gig, often paid subsistence wages and receive no benefits.

Well, then, what’s good for the sauce for the goose  is good for the gander. Partner ranks have now evolved into a new three tiered caste system as well:  Highly compensated equity partners, a second tier of less handsomely paid equity partners and a great swathe of contract partners. As Harper, Reeser and McKenna observe, the ratio of compensation from the most highly compensated equity partner to the lowest is staggering; in some firms it’s ten or twelve to one.  The ratio for most highly compensated equity partner to the lowest level of contract partner is often even greater.

While we may have thought that The Great Recession brought about the demise of the leverage model for law firms and that the new model for the Twenty-first Century Law Firm is an inverted pyramid, the good news, folks, is that leverage is back and the pyramid has similarly returned to its old footings.  Except that the pyramid is no longer one with a broad base of associates and partners decreasing in number at each higher level of the edifice. With the devolution of associate ranks to the caste system, the refusal of clients to pay for first and second year associates and clients’ not permitting law firms to mark up and sell at a profit the work of temporary staff lawyers, associates no longer make up the base of the pyramid. Rather, it’s the ranks of contract partners who lie at the base of the pyramid and support those at its summit. As those at the top need more support for their compensation requirements, some equity partners find themselves cast into supporting roles keeping the rich and famous comfortably enjoying the view from the top. If more financial support is needed, partners are simply de-equitized, move down a notch and then fill out the base of the pyramid. Partners deemed insufficiently productive are asked to leave. The notion that partners are owners of the enterprise is gone.

Ample anecdotal evidence from the field corroborates the return of the leverage model, albeit at the nominal partner level. We have heard from scores of managing partners that those at the partner at the partner ranks busier than ever, working longer hours and grinding out the work as never before. Equity partner compensation at the pinnacle is at eye popping numbers.

The only issue not yet adequately addressed is the future of the pyramid when those at the top see the lush neighboring pyramid across the expanse with a taller peak, more lavish accommodations emitting a siren call for all those who want even more. Collapse of the structure comes not from erosion at the supporting base, but rather from the loss of the pinnacle.

Keeping the structure erect and enduring simply requires a return to the days of yore when all partners truly felt like they were proud owners of the enterprise, and a return to feelings of genuine esprit de corps, mutual respect, pride, loyalty and genuine collaboration.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

Citibanks’ Fourth Quarter Report on Law Firm Profitability: Bleak, But, on the Bright Side, That’s As Good As It Gets

Citibanks’ Fourth Quarter Report on Law Firm Profitability: Bleak, But, on the Bright Side, That’s As Good As It Gets.

Citibank’s Fourth Quarter Report on Law Firm Profitability: Bleak, But, on the Bright Side, That’s As Good As It Gets

Citigroup Center
Citigroup Center (Photo credit: LifeSupercharger)

Jerome Kowalski

Kowalski & Associates

February, 2012  

                                                                   

Don’t have enough to fret about?

Citibanks’ report for law firms for the fourth quarter of 2011 is out for and there is little in it that brings cheer. It also gives some us some sense of prescience in that our 2012 forecasts seem to be being realized. Earlier observations on Citibank’s third quarter report and its mid year report, all read in sequence, paint a rather unhappy portrait.

Consistent with what we all have all been seeing in recent weeks as law firms begin announcing results for 2011, last year generally saw a barely perceptible rise in revenues (4.1%) and continued rising expenses. The continued escalation on the expense side is of some serious concern as law firm managers continue to devote substantial energy to irradiate an ever metastasizing wave of expenses, with the wave of rising expenses seemingly unstoppable.

Here is some of the other disturbing news:

  • Citibank noted that in the second half of 2011, demand for legal services, “particularly in transactional work, withered away and has yet to bloom again.” In our view, we do not see transactional work flowering soon because of the moribund capital markets, the decline in asset value and the business world’s disinclination to take risk in uncertain times.
  • The report notes that profits per equity partner at the law firms surveyed rose an average of 3.3% in 2011. However, by hewing to the PPEP artifice, the report does not report how much of this increased profit was derived by de-equitazation, “shortening of the collection cycle,” expense deferrals or other accounting legerdemain. While Citi did report that “equity partner head count grew only marginally, reinforcing the view … it has become a lot harder to become an equity partner and remain an equity partner.”
  • While hourly rates increased slightly, realizations declined. Of course, that’s like the law firm partner who, when asked what his hourly rates are replies “$1,000 an hour when I can get it, but that’s rare, otherwise it’s $450.”
  • Headcount grew marginally more than demand, resulting in a decline in productivity.
  • In order to get to the modest increase in PPEP, law firms slogged the living daylights out of their accounts receivable. Well, that’s good for the take home pay for partners in 2011, but it adds to the challenges of 2012, since both demand is weak and there is less A/R in inventory to turn into cash in the current year.

What does this all mean for the current year? Citi tells us “all said, not a bad year and we suspect likely to be the new definition of a good year for the legal industry at least for the foreseeable future.”  In other words, this is about as good as it gets. By that, could it be that like Jack Nicholson’s character, could we find happiness in this somewhat addled state?

Citi is also telling law firms that it’s time to trim the herd again in order to increase productivity and realizations. So, I am afraid that we will see another round of layoffs, lateral moves, de-equitizations, and mandatory retirements. If you are a partner in law firm, pay very close attention to how your firm is doing, since there is a strong likelihood that we will sadly see some law firm failures; you need to be prepared and not caught by surprise.   And if you are a vendor or service provider to law firms, look for cutbacks and a longer remittance cycle.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

Private Equity Investments in Law Firms Have Arrived in the UK and Have Largely Ignored BigLaw; What Will Happen as This Phenomenon Arrives in the United States?

Private Equity Investments in Law Firms Have arrived in the UK and Have Largely Ignored BigLaw; What Will Happen as This Phenomenon Arrives in the United States?.

Private Equity Investments in Law Firms Have Arrived in the UK and Have Largely Ignored BigLaw; What Will Happen as This Phenomenon Arrives in the United States?

Tesco in St Peters Street, St Albans. Historic...

Image via Wikipedia

                                                                                      Jerome Kowalski

                                                                                      Kowalski & Associates

                                                                                      February, 2012

After so much anticipation, the law permitting nonlawyer equity investment in law firms (“Alternative Business Structures” or “Tesco” laws) took effect in England in November and for BigLaw, it is much more of a yawn than a yowl. I can’t say I am very much surprised. I previously predicted this result.

As some have noted, the proceeds of capital infusions by outside investors in large law firms will likely be applied to technology and most particularly knowledge management systems, all with a view of lowering costs to consumers of legal services. The result would be increased commoditization and reduced revenues per lawyer. Thus, the consequence of such investments may well be that unless one creates a Goldman Sachs-type leverage ratio (10,000 to 1?), an extremely unlikely result for any law firm; the investor will simply not get the anticipated return. Moreover, as clients become increasingly reluctant to pay for associates’ time, particularly first and second year associates and the profession continues to move to an inverted pyramid model, that kind of leverage just won’t happen.

The practice areas which yield the highest return still remain in the plaintiffs’ class action bar and in big stakes high end plaintiffs’ contingency cases. The recent acquisition by Australian based, publicly held Slater & Gordon of Liverpool personal injury firm Russell, Jones & Walker for £58 Million serves to prove that point. Similarly, just yesterday, private equity firm Duke Street announced an LBO for insurance litigation firms Cogent Law and Plexus Law.  Massive class actions and other high end cases chew up enormous amounts of capital. Law firms which have been active in this world have already amassed substantial capital and have the internal resources to fund these cases. Some still utilize traditional institutional lending from banks at favorable rates. Others utilize litigation funding companies which do tend to charge exorbitant interest rates; but, then again, these funding companies accept all of the risk in making non-recourse loans and at the end of the day, they do not remain partners of the law firm.

Others have noted that outside investors in a firms would exert some degree of control within a law firm and the danger they highlights is that such investors will impair the independence of the lawyers’ judgments in directing that efficiency, rather than the clients’ best interests will be a driver in handling a client engagement, all in violation of Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

An added impediment is the preservation of client secrets and confidences. Non lawyer investor participation in law firm management necessarily makes non-lawyers privy to such secrets and confidences, with no mechanism to police the maintenance of such confidentiality by these non-lawyers.

Ultimately, the killer ethical rule in the United States that dooms private equity investment is not the confidentiality provisions or the requirement that lawyers act with independence. Rather, it’s one never mentioned in the discourse on this subject: The prohibition that bars lawyers from entering into agreements that limit their ability to practice law. Thus, equity investors in law firms could never have any assurance that a law firm’s most valuable assets — its partners– would exercise their free agency rights and ride down the elevator one day, never to return.

As the ABA agonizes over whether US law firms should permit nonlawyer employees of a law firm to hold an equity investment in law firms, the real question concerns the underlying issue of adoption of Tesco laws in the United States. The New York State Bar Association announced just a few days ago that it would create a committee, under the capable leadership of immediate past NYSBA president Stephen Younger to study the issue. But, even as he seated this committee, current NYSBA President Vincent Doyle proclaimed that the Association “remains opposed to nonlawyer ownership of law firms.” Sounds like a fair unbiased hearing on the subject won’t be very likely here.

The reality is that bar associations and government regulators were and continue to be asleep at the switch as nonlawyer owned and unlicensed LPO’s moved and continue to move to openly practice law in the United States and nonlawyer owned and unlicensed Internet providers of legal services do the same, These phenomena were the result of market forces and a bit of ingenuity and brazenness by these entities and the sloth of the regulators. The fact is that we do have a model under which non lawyers can effectively invest in law firms (yes, even commercial law firms), earn a solid return and even exercise some degree of control in what we believe to be an ethically compliant fashion. Interested, call me and ask about it.

© Jerome Kowalski, February, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

It Shouldn’t Suck to be an Associate at a Law Firm, Part II

It Shouldn’t Suck to be an Associate at a Law Firm, Part II.

It Shouldn’t Suck to be an Associate at a Law Firm, Part II

Front page of the first issue of The Wall Stre...

Image via WikipediaImage via Wikipedia

                                                                             Jerome Kowalski

                                                                             Kowalski & Associates

                                                                             January, 2012

                                                                            

Today’s Wall Street Journal  features a piece entitled “Law Firm Keep Squeezing Associates,” which will likely engender some great buzz on the blogosphere serving the law firm associate population and, in all likelihood, a yawn from law firm partners. This article comes on the heels of the second annual extravaganza, attendance for which is appropriately limited to but a few elites, entitled “The Annual Spring Bonuses Follies.” In all events, I would suggest that perhaps law firm partners and law firm leadership ought to take a closer at some of the issues raised in the Journal.

The Journal generally addressed the well worn issue of fewer openings at BigLaw and fewer job prospects for recently graduated law students. Anecdotal evidence suggests hiring is down about 30% (a fact we also have observed as generally true). The Journal also mentioned the longer and rockier road to partnership.

But the big takeaway in the piece, a fact well already known to many of us, is that since the crash four years ago, associate compensation has been stagnant, while the average associate has seen an increase in his or her workload by 2.3% since 2007, which the Journal calculates to be approximately 50 additional hours a year.  The new base “normal” appears to be approximately 1,650 hours a year, which the Journal Suggest amounts to about 37.5 hours a week; the Journal relies on the besieged NALP (hardly a bulwark for full and open disclosure where employment opportunities for lawyers are concerned) for arriving at this conclusion. Yale Law School last year did its own math and concluded that in order to bill 1,850 hours a year, an associate needed to spend at least 55 hours a week in the office, with three weeks of vacation and two weeks of vacation, sick days and holidays.  Yale concludes that in order for an associate to bill in the 2,000 a year range, he or she will need to work for about 12 hours a day and three weekend days a month. And that does not accurately include time spent at departmental meetings, firm functions, commuting, serving on administrative committees, recruiting, pro bono work, griping about being overworked or otherwise shooting the breeze with colleagues, friends or family. The reality, as we all know, is that an honest time reporter needs to work in the seventy hour a week range.

But let’s get back to that additional 50 hours a year squeezed out of associates since the onset of The Great Recession. Roughly translated, at an average of $300 an hour, associates have each contributed an extra $150,000 to their respective firm’s bottom line, without their firm’s incurring any incremental cost. A few firms, in an entirely short sighted fashion, in our opinion, have bestowed “Spring bonuses,” generally topped out at $37,000, while the bulk of BigLaw firms have simply enhanced partner profitability.

The fact is that Spring bonuses have a Marie Antoinette quality about them, a sort of noblesse oblige.  As Steve Harper noted, law firms should do better. They do not enhance associate morale nor do they halt associate attrition. The temporal cure to associate attrition has been an abysmal job market. But, for those who are planning on checking out, all that many law firms have done is have associates defer packing their bags until the bonus check clears. Spring bonuses not quite as satisfying as yesterday’s passing summer breezes, the recent autumnal foliage or Thanksgiving turkey. The breezes, foliage and turkey will likely return at their respective times and seasons; Spring bonuses, who knows?  With law firm revenues rising last year at a sluggish 3% and expenses at 9%, law firms, under pressure to keep PPP at the highest levels and the bulk of AmLaw 100 firms having gotten along just fine without them, this chimera will likely evaporate.

Well then, what’s the point?  There are two: We all know that associates are law firms’ most important profit centers. We also need to be reminded that keeping the young men and women toiling away productively at 60 hours a week, during their decade-long march to the brass ring, optimally requires them to have a high degree of job satisfaction, which has nothing to do with compensation or bonuses.  For nearly a century, every study performed by every industrial psychologist and labor economist has consistently reported that when people identify the reasons they leave their jobs, they rate compensation at the very bottom of their lists.  Overwork ranks at about the same. We know how to keep associates satisfied and productive, but we largely continue to ignore long learned basic human resources principles.

So, let’s take a look at the extra $150,000 per annum each associate is contributing to law firm revenue streams.  Why not engage your associates in a dialogue as to what should be done to improve their lives. Some might suggest an increase in base compensation to help them amortize student loans (and if you hear that don’t wince and worry what the neighbors might think), some might suggest rolling the work squeeze and laying off some of those collective additional 50 hours a year on a couple of new associates. After all, if you have 100 associates, you have effectively replaced two associates by having those remaining in the galleon just row harder. Exhausted oarsmen often collapse or jump ship. The golden chains of Spring bonuses won’t keep your associates tied to their oars. In fact, even The Great Recession and the burden of student debt do not necessarily keep them in the ship’s underbelly deprived of sunlight and overworked; one associate recently left his firm to open a bike shop, anther jumped ship to simply walk across the country.

The second point is quite simply, it still shouldn’t suck to be an associate at a law firm.

© Jerome Kowalski, January, 2012. All Rights reserved.

Jerry Kowalski is the founder of Kowalski & Associates, a consulting firm serving the legal profession exclusively. Jerry is a regular contributor to a variety of publications and is a frequent (always engaging and often humorous) speaker to a variety of forums. Jerry can be reached at jkowalski@kowalskiassociates.com or at 212 832 9070, Extension 310.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 650 other followers